Illinois Mobile App Master Calendar

Abstract: Chile's Sistema de Admisión Escolar (SAE) replaced a fragmented, often discretionary admissions process with a transparent, strategy-proof deferred acceptance mechanism that spans both public and subsidized private schools. Using nationwide administrative records, household surveys, and multiple randomized and quasi-experimental evaluations, the project traces how ten years of SAE affected match quality, access to higher value-added schools, and perceptions of fairness, with especially large gains for disadvantaged students. At the same time, the evidence shows that behavioral frictions—short and risky application lists, limited awareness of nearby options, and biased beliefs about quality and price—still constrain outcomes. Information tools such as real-time risk warnings, personalized recommendation reports, and the MIME explorer meaningfully improve applications and reduce non-assignment risks but also create congestion and spillovers that must be managed in general equilibrium. The paper concludes by analyzing the new Anótate en la Lista aftermarket platform and distilling governance lessons for algorithmic transparency and incremental mechanism improvements.