Seminar Series - Visiting Scholar Yongsoon Kim

Nuclear Issues: The North Korean Nuclear Problem

Center for Global Studies, Visiting Scholar - Yongsoon Kim

Abstract: 

This seminar explains why peninsula denuclearization failed as policy and what replaces it in 2026. Diplomacy produced freezes—the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2005 9.19 Joint Statement, 2007 disablement, and the 2018–19 summits—but never rollback. Each breakdown bought capability. Agreements died on verification and sequencing, not on missing adjectives.

The program predates the crises (1956 Soviet peaceful-use deal; Yongbyon from 1962; NPT 1985; 1991 inter-Korean declaration). Two dual-use paths remain inside a civilian fuel cycle: reactor–reprocessing for plutonium and centrifuges for HEU—the core inspection problem. Six Punggye-ri tests (2006–2017) are an engineering sequence: about 1 kt to 140+ kt (2017 ~10× Hiroshima). No test since 2017 is not no program; 2018 demolitions were theatre. SIPRI (January 2026) estimates about 60 assembled warheads and material for 90+; most are likely lower-yield fission, with no public proof of an operational ICBM-mated warhead. A device without a missile is a test; a missile without a surviving re-entry vehicle is a parade. Solid-fuel ICBMs (Hwasong-18/19; Hwasong-20, October 2025) collapse pre-emption windows; KN-23-class SRBMs are the war-fighting piece versus the South.

Doctrine moved from a 2005 bargaining chip to constitutional nuclear-state status, a 2022 pre-emption law if leadership is threatened, a two-hostile-states line, and a September 2025 demand that Washington drop denuclearization as the price of talks. Motives are plural: post–Cold War shock; peninsula competition (including Seoul’s 1970s program); the “lesson market” of Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine; and a shift from shield to tool (Russia alignment). NPT double standards are real (India, Israel, stalled Article VI; New START expired 5 February 2026), as are DPRK-specific aggravators. South Korea is the other nuclear biography: 1974 alliance coercion closed a secret program; 2025–26 SSN and enrichment talks, and Asan support of 76.2% for an independent bomb, test that taboo. Three clocks run at once. Three frames follow: live with deterrence; freeze-first arms control; and, in any case, rehearse accident and unauthorized use. Capability without doctrine control cuts both ways; the regime that internationalized this problem is itself being de-internationalized.

Bio: 

Yongsoon Kim is a visiting scholar at the Center for Global Studies. He works on the politics of Northeast Asian security and is just as interested in method: surveys, public opinion, and how we actually know what we think we know about the Peninsula. Beyond traditional security, he has a strong interest in non-traditional security, which has been the focus of his recent research and teaching. He teaches contemporary global issues, research methods, and the international politics of the Korean Peninsula. His recent work includes an SSCI article on Xi Jinping’s North Korea policy, research on inter-Korean energy cooperation as a security issue, middle-power strategy in a tightening regional order, and Pyongyang’s bargaining strategies. He translated Victor Cha’s The Impossible State into Korean and has spent years on policy projects with the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently a visiting professor at Yonsei GSIS and a senior research fellow at the Center for North Korean Studies, Yonsei Institute for Sinology.