DATE CHANGE: Philosophy Colloquium Lecture Series: Graham Oddie, University of Colorado

Parity at Risk

Things could be worse. Things could also be better. Or they could be exactly equally good. But could things be neither worse, nor better, nor equally good? There are interesting arguments for that possibility. If two things do not instantiate any of the three standard value relations we might conclude that they are simply incomparable for value. But there may be another possibility—a fourth genuinely comparative  value relation— parity. Things that are on a par do not instantiate any of the three standard value relations but they are (in a sense which will be made precise) still comparable for value. We start with a fundamental value relation, at least as good, and provide an analysis of parity, distinguishing it from brute incomparability.  We then show that within a probabilistic framework the parity postulate entails some rather unpalatable consequences involving risky alternatives.

This paper is jointly authored  by Graham Oddie  and Gustaf Arrhenius (Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm). Oddie is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, and Arrhenius is professor of philosophy at the University of Stockholm.) Oddie will give the presentation