ACDIS: Arms Control & Domestic and International Security

Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Deal

Guest Lecture Provided By: Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour - Policy and Communications Manager at the Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction

This talk examines how diplomacy can contribute to managing and potentially mitigating protracted international conflicts through re-framing security issues. Focusing on the ways in which the United States and Iran performed during the Iran nuclear negotiations (2003–2015) and the resulting Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, this talk provides an alternative to dominant policy and scholarly perspectives that emphasize coercive tools—such as sanctions and military pressure—as primary drivers of negotiated agreements. Instead, it draws on securitization theory, developed by Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School, to analyze how the construction and transformation of security narratives shape the trajectory and possibilities of negotiation.

The talk introduces and develops the concept of mutual desecuritization within  strategic and discursive contexts. Building on the constructivist insight that “security is what states make of it," the analysis highlights how a desecuritized approach to security can expand bargaining space, reduce political and ideological constraints, and facilitate compromise even among deeply distrustful actors.

Empirically, the talk traces key phases of the Iran nuclear negotiations, identifying periods of securitization and desecuritization across actors and over time. At the same time, it critically engages the limits of this outcome, acknowledging the fragility and eventual collapse of the agreement, and examining how processes of re-securitization contributed to renewed escalation.

Rather than evaluating the long-term success of the Iran deal, the talk focuses on a more fundamental question: how was agreement possible at all under conditions of sustained hostility? In doing so, it reframes the negotiations as a case of conflict management transitioning, albeit briefly, toward stabilization. The analysis positions desecuritization not as a normative ideal, but as an analytical lens that helps explain how diplomatic openings emerge and why they are difficult to sustain.

By bridging securitization theory with negotiation analysis, this talk contributes to broader debates on international security, arms control, and conflict management. It argues that even in adversarial contexts where underlying conflicts persist, shifts away from rigidly securitized frameworks can play a critical role in creating the conditions under which negotiation, and limited forms of cooperation become possible.