Department of Philosophy Events

Join us for a lecture by Andrea Scarantino, a professor of Neuroscience and Philosophy at Georgia State University. 

How Emotions About Fiction Motivate Behavior

Walton (1978, 1990, 1997) has influentially argued that the emotions we have toward fictional people and situations do not motivate behavior, despite having phenomenological, physiological, and expressive features in common with the emotions we have toward real-world people and situations. Because emotions about fictional objects have their motivation thwarted, Walton concluded that they are quasi-emotions. This proposal has been widely rejected, and quasi-emotions have been reconceptualized as full-fledged emotions essential for explaining our engagement with fiction. What has largely survived in the post-Walton debate is the view that emotions toward fiction lack motivational force. Critics of Walton’s quasi-emotions support this view but add that having motivational force is not essential for being an emotion. I disagree on both counts: Emotions are, or essentially involve, motivations to act, and emotions about fictional objects are motivationally powerful. The difference between emotions about fictional objects and emotions about the real world is to be found at the level of regulation, not at the level of motivation. Regulation of emotions about fictional objects can lead to various outcomes, ranging from expressing our motivation directly or indirectly to inhibiting such motivation entirely, depending on the emotion and the circumstances.