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ECE 590 I POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS SEMINAR

Event Type
Informational
Sponsor
ECE ILLINOIS
Location
ECEB Room 4070
Date
Oct 7, 2019   3:00 pm   3:50 pm
Views
9
Originating Calendar
Illinois ECE Calendar

WHEN: Monday, October 7, 2019, 3:00 – 3:50 p.m.

WHERE: Room 4070, ECEB

SPEAKER: Olaolu Ajala, Electrical and Computer Engineering, UIUC

TITLE: "An Approach for the Robust Synchronization of Electric Power Generators"

ABSTRACT: We consider the problem to synchronize two electric power generators, one of which – the so-called leader – serves a time-varying load, so that the two can be connected to ultimately form a single power system. Each generator is represented by a second-order reduced state-space model. We assume that the generator that serves no load initially – the so-called follower – has access to measurements of the leader generator phase angle corrupted by some additive disturbances. We deploy these measurements and leverage results on reduced-order observers with ISS-type robustness to propose a procedure that drives (i) the angular velocity of the follower close enough to that of the leader, and (ii) the phase angle of the follower close enough to that of the point at which both systems can be electrically connected. An explicit bound on the synchronization error in terms of the measurement disturbance and the variations in the electrical load served by the leader is computed. We illustrate the procedure via numerical simulations.

SPEAKER: Khaled Mohammed Alshehri, Electrical and Computer Engineering, UIUC

TITLE: "The Price of Aggregation: Quantification of the Impacts of Distributed Energy Resources on Electricity Market Efficiency"

ABSTRACT: This presentation focuses on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of DERs and explore to what extent such benefits are affected by the profit-maximizing nature of the aggregator. We deploy a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between aggregators and DER owners. The proposed model explicitly takes into account the stochastic nature of the DER supply. We explicitly characterize the equilibria of the game under general assumptions and provide illustrative examples to quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experiments illustrate the impact of uncertainty and the total capacity of DER integration on the overall market efficiency.

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